The short answer
You are ready when an attacker would struggle to get in, struggle to spread, and could not stop you recovering. That means at least two backups kept offline, encrypted and regularly tested, as CISA's #StopRansomware guide recommends; MFA on email, remote access, cloud administration and privileged accounts; prompt patching; limited admin rights and a segmented network; someone watching, including after hours; and a written response plan.
Start with recovery, because it is your safety net
Backups decide whether ransomware is a bad week or an existential event, and attackers target them early. We check:
An offline or immutable copy
A backup on the same network, with the same admin password, gets encrypted too.
Cloud services covered
Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and SaaS need their own backup; provider retention is not one.
Whole-system restores
One file proves little; restore and time a key system end to end.
A recovery order
Identity and network first, then systems that bring in revenue or keep people safe.
Power for the restore
Backup storage, network and recovery machines on UPS, inverter or generator through outages.
More on objectives and testing: why a backup is not the same as a recovery plan.
Make getting in harder
Most incidents start with something ordinary: a stolen password, a phishing email or an unpatched internet-facing device. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework covers the same ground.
MFA where it matters
Email, VPN, remote desktop, cloud admin, finance; phishing-resistant for administrators.
Retire legacy sign-in
Old protocols that cannot do MFA are a common way around it.
Patch on a rhythm
Critical fixes for firewalls, VPNs and remote access tools cannot wait a month.
Filter email
And publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC so your domain is harder to spoof.
Remove what you do not use
Old remote access tools, exposed remote desktop, forgotten test servers.
Make spreading harder
Real damage needs administrator access and a path to your servers and backups.
Separate admin accounts
Nobody reads email with an account that can change the domain.
Least privilege
Access fits the role, reviewed when people change roles or leave.
Segment the network
Servers, backups, point-of-sale or production and staff devices in separate zones.
EDR everywhere
Every laptop, desktop and server, spotting behaviour before encryption (EDR vs antivirus).
Searchable logs
Kept long enough to reconstruct what happened.
Rather talk it through? If you are not sure whether your backups would survive an attack, we can review them with you and test a restore. Talk to a Promatics specialist
Decide now what you will do on the worst day
Decisions are hard to make well at 3 a.m. with systems down. Make them now:
| Decision | Agree now |
|---|---|
| Who leads? | Incident lead and deputy; contacts for IT, leadership, your legal adviser, communications, insurer |
| What gets isolated, by whom? | Most response guides start by isolating affected systems from the internet and internal networks. Agree who has authority |
| Who do you call outside? | Report ransomware to the police and to ngCERT. If personal data may be involved, the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 requires notifying the NDPC within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach likely to risk people's rights and freedoms. Banks, payment service providers and other regulated firms may also have sector duties, for example to the Central Bank of Nigeria |
| Will you pay? | CISA discourages paying: payment does not ensure you get your data back and can encourage further attacks, and there may be legal exposure. Discuss with leadership, your legal adviser and your insurer beforehand |
| Where is the plan? | On paper, and somewhere independent of your systems |
Our guide to the first 24 hours of a cyber incident walks through the response itself.
What usually goes wrong
- Backups never restored. The job reported success for months; the data was incomplete.
- Backups on the domain. Attackers used the same stolen admin account to delete them.
- MFA with exceptions. A service account or senior leader was excluded "temporarily" and stayed that way.
- Alerts nobody saw. EDR flagged the attack on a Friday evening; the first person looked on Monday.
Ransomware readiness checklist
Recovery
- Two or more backups, at least one offline or immutable
- Backup credentials separate from everyday administrator accounts
- Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and key SaaS data backed up
- Full restore of a critical system tested and timed within six months
- Recovery order agreed with the business
- Backup storage, network and recovery hardware on UPS, inverter or generator
Prevention
- MFA on email, remote access, cloud admin and finance systems
- Legacy sign-in protocols blocked
- Critical patches for internet-facing systems applied promptly
- SPF, DKIM and DMARC published for your domains
- Unused remote access tools and exposed services removed
Containment and detection
- Separate administrator accounts; least privilege reviewed
- Network segmented between staff devices, servers and backups
- EDR on every endpoint and server, with alerts reviewed around the clock
- Logs retained and searchable
Response
- Incident lead, deputy and external contacts named
- Authority to isolate systems agreed
- Reporting contacts listed (police, ngCERT, NDPC, regulator, insurer, legal adviser)
- Position on ransom payment discussed with leadership
- Plan printed and stored off your network; tabletop exercise held
When to bring in help
A capable internal IT person can handle much of this list, especially MFA, patching and email records. Bring in a professional when you cannot say whether a restore would work or how long it takes, nobody watches alerts after hours, nobody has the full picture of backups, identity and network built by different people over years, or an insurer, client or board wants evidence, not reassurance.
An AI assistant gives a good generic checklist; it cannot log in to your backup console, find the service account with no MFA, test a restore on a Saturday or answer the phone. Our cybersecurity services team does, with 24/7 monitoring and support for managed-service clients.
Limitations
Based on CISA and NIST guidance as of the review date. General information, not a substitute for assessing your systems, and not legal advice on reporting obligations or ransom payments.
Sources and further reading
Product capabilities and guidance change. These are the primary sources this article relies on, checked on the review date above.
- #StopRansomware guide, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
- Cybersecurity Framework, National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Nigeria's computer emergency response team (ngCERT), Nigerian Communications Commission, ngCERT
- Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 and breach notification guidance, Nigeria Data Protection Commission
This article is general information, not legal, accounting or security advice for your specific situation. Examples are hypothetical unless stated otherwise.